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In the Sweat Box: A Historical Perspective on the
Detention of Material Witnesses
Carolyn B. Ramsey*
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Justice Department
detained scores of allegedly suspicious persons under a federal material
witness statute-a tactic thatprovoked a great deal of controversy. Most
critics assume that the abuse of material witness laws is a new
development. Yet, rather than being transformed by the War on Terror,
the detention of material witnesses is a coercive strategy that police
officers across the nation have used since the nineteenth century to build
cases against suspects. Fears of extraordinary violence or social
breakdown played at most an indirect role in its advent and growth.
Rather, it has long been used to obtainprosecution evidence in ordinary
cases of murder, robbery, prostitution, and other street crimes.
Historically, no stark divide between the innocent witness and the
suspected criminal existed in the minds of the police. Indeed, material
witness detention contributed to the rise of incommunicado interrogation
and numbered among the tactics identified in the Wickersham
Commission's expos of the third degree in 1931.
This Essay demonstrates that the story of material witness detention
is one of stasis, not of change. For more than a century, the field
practices ofpolice and magistrateshave been unresponsive to reforms in
statutory and constitutional law or to sporadicpublic pressure on behalf
of detainees deemed to have knowledge of a crime. In telling such a
story, this Essay seeks, not to defend the Justice Department, but to
suggest that intense scholarlyfocus on September 11 as a watershed in
the history of criminal procedure obscures ways in which the gradual
consolidation of governmental power over more than a century has
fostered an increasingly coercive and secretive relationship between the
individualand the police.

Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School; J.D., Stanford Law
School; M.A. (History), Stanford University; B.A., University of California. I would like to thank
Ariela Gross, Dan Klerman, and other participants in a workshop sponsored by the Center for Law,
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and the World
Trade Center, scholars have criticized the Justice Department for arresting and
detaining many individuals of Middle-Eastern origin under a federal material
1
2
witness statute' without pressing charges against them. In this and other ways,
September 11 has acquired the status of a watershed-a definitive, transforming
moment in criminal procedure. However, although the War on Terror has involved
increased surveillance and searches of both citizens and non-citizens, intense
scholarly focus on the September 11 tragedy has exaggerated its importance in the
history of the state's exertion of power over the individual. This Essay explores
the legal history of one tool of law enforcement-the detention of material
witnesses-to suggest that September 11 did not change everything in criminal
procedure. 3 Rather than marking a momentous transition, this tragic date simply
accelerated pre-existing trends in state control.
Most evaluations of the government's anti-terror policy understate or ignore
the roots of material witness detention in the aggrandizement of power by law
enforcement agencies, starting in the second-half of the nineteenth century.4 The
late 1800s and early 1900s witnessed the rise of an "institutional state" that
provided the people with municipal services, such as fire fighting, water treatment,
and sanitation, but also devised new means of exercising coercive control over
them.5 Indeed, the expansion of state power in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries included the unstated assumption that police and prosecutors

2

18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1986).
See Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of "Hold Until Cleared": Reexamining

Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September l1th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REv. 677,
678-80 (2005); Laurie L. Levenson, Detention, Material Witnesses & the War on Terrorism, 35 LoY.
L.A. L. REv. 1217, 1223 (2002); Stacey M. Studnicki & John P. Apol, Witness Detention and
Intimidation: The History and Future of Material Witness Law, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 483, 486

(2002).
3 For scholarly discussion of whether September 11 constituted a turning point in such areas
as American foreign policy, domestic culture, language, citizenship, and international law, see

generally SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT? (Mary L. Dudziak ed., 2003)
(presenting an interdisciplinary collection of essays that illuminate these topics).
4 See Bascuas, supra note 2, at 681 (arguing that the Founders never authorized and the
Supreme Court never approved the detention of a material witness unless the witness refused to sign
a recognizance); Levenson, supra note 2, at 1223 ("With the War on Terrorism, the legal seas have
changed. The designation of material witness has often become a temporary moniker to identify an
individual who will soon bear the status of defendant."); Studnicki & Apol, supra note 2, at 486
(contending that the investigatory detention of witnesses in the wake of September 11 constituted the
misuse of laws intended only to guarantee the appearance of a witness at trial).
5

See

ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA,

1800-

1880 149, 164-65, 223, 230-31 (1989). Cf Robert G. Barrows, UrbanizingAmerica, in THE GILDED
AGE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICA 113 (Charles W. Calhoun ed., Scholarly
Resources 2007) (discussing positive aspects of increased state presence, such as municipal
improvements in water treatment and sewage management).
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had broad authority to investigate crime in any way that was not expressly
forbidden to them. Judicial and legislative bodies only sporadically imposed limits
or penalties that threatened that assumption. This sense of entitlement to pursue
law-enforcement goals at any cost, sometimes in defiance of the formal law, is
evidenced in the detention of material witnesses in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.
Yet, in the academic literature, it has gone virtually unnoticed that, as a
historical matter, material witness detention contributed to the rise of
incommunicado police interrogation and that it numbered among the tactics
identified in the Wickersham Commission's expos6 of the third degree in 1931.6
For example, Laurie Levenson mistakenly describes the arrest and detention of
dozens of people suspected of links to Al Qaeda as the misuse of a legitimate, old
power to insure the appearance of witnesses at trial.7 In her view, the September
11 attack was a catalyst that produced a sea change in the way material witness
laws are employed. Dating back to the First Judiciary Act of 1789, she argues,
"material witnesses were conceptually different from defendants who were
incarcerated." 8 In contrast, she contends that during the twenty-first century War
on Terror, the government has used material witness laws for the novel purpose of9
preventively detaining "an individual who will soon bear the status of defendant."
Material witness statutes had detractors prior to the advent of the Bush
Administration's anti-terror policies. In the law journals of the 1960s, for
example, authors complained that the revolution in criminal procedure
accomplished by the Warren Court failed to generate protections for "innocent
witness(es) to the crime." 10 However, like Levenson's, earlier scholarly critiques
of material witness statutes assumed that the long-standing use of such laws was to
detain persons unwilling or unable to guarantee their appearance in court.'1 These
writers complained about hardship on the witness, who languished in jail for weeks
6

See NAT'L COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN

LAW ENFORCEMENT 54, 93, 129 (1931).
7 Levenson, supra note 2, at 1223.
8 Id.
9 Id. Nearly ninety percent of the September 11 dragnet detainees were never charged with
any terrorist acts. See Michael Isikoff, Periscope: A Sharp Look at Material Witness Arrests,
NEWSWEEK, July 4, 2005, at 6. Two notable exceptions include the prosecution and conviction of
Zacharias Moussaoui for conspiring with the September 11 hijackers and the entry of a guilty plea by
James Ujaama, who was charged with aiding the Taliban.
10 Ronald Carlson, Jailingthe Innocent: The Plight of the Material Witness, 55 IOWA L. REV.

1, 1(1969).

11 See id. at 17; Comment, PretrialDetention of Witnesses, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 700, 714-15
(1969); Robert Coyle, Case Comment, Confining Material Witnesses in CriminalCases, 20 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 164, 165 (1963). Cf Lisa Chanow Dykstra, Note, The Application of Material Witness
Provisions: A Case Study-Are Homeless Material Witnesses Entitled to Due Process and
Representation by Counsel?, 36 VILL. L. REv. 597, 601-02 (1991) (describing purpose behind state
and federal statutes).
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or even months without monetary compensation or legal counsel.' 2 But they, too,
perpetuated a false dichotomy between the innocent witness and the crime
suspect t 3-a dichotomy that rarely existed in the minds of the interrogating officer.

I am aware of only one scholarly article-a legal history by Wesley MacNeil
Oliver-that recognizes the role of material witness detention, beginning in the14
nineteenth century, as a tool for constructing a case against the witness himself.
Oliver associates the rise of material witness detention with the creation of New

York City's first professional police force, claims that potential defendants were
often detained as witnesses, and traces the role of reform campaigns in achieving
the temporary abrogation of material witness detention in 1883. Yet Oliver fails to
emphasize that, notwithstanding sporadic efforts at reform, the story of material
witness detention is largely one of stasis, not of change.
Despite a professionalism movement that transformed the police into a crimefighting bureaucracy equipped with new technologies like the call-box, the twoway radio, and the automobile, 15 the confinement and interrogation of witnesses

survived into the twentieth century and proved intransigent to reform. Such
negative intrusion in the lives of individuals meant that officers, increasingly
isolated from the urban public by the advent of a centralized command structure

and the reduction of police charity toward the homeless and the mentally ill, came
to be seen as agents of coercive control. 16 Placed in this context, the brief "fall" of

12

See Carlson, supra note 10, at 2-4, 6, 8; Dykstra, supra note 11, at 646. See also Coyle,

supra note 11, at 166 (noting that a detained witness lacked "the right to have the court appoint
counsel for him if he [was] unable to obtain counsel for himself.").
13 See Carlson, supra note 10, at 1. See also Coyle, supra note 11, at 167-68 ("Even after
considering the protections afforded a material witness, it still seems quite unfair to confine a
completely innocent person in jail simply because he had the misfortune of witnessing a crime.");
Comment, PretrialDetention of Witnesses, supra note 11, at 703 ("A competing interest is that of the
witness, an individual who has committed no wrong, to have maximum freedom of movement.").
Journalists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also emphasized that most detained
witnesses were innocent. See, e.g., Uncle Sam's Crime School, Los ANGELES TIMES, June 10, 1928,
at K13 (criticizing the incarceration of a material witness accused of no crime, but detained to make
sure he will testify in some important case in the same facilities as convicts, the mentally ill, and
others); Untitled Article, CfCAGo DAILY TRIBuNE, May 15, 1873, at 4 (complaining that "innocent
witnesses" were remanded to county jail simply because they could not afford to post bond for their
appearance). Yet, this view existed in tension with awareness on the part of newspapers and their
readers that police and prosecutors sometimes sought to indict so-called witnesses once they had
worked up a case against them. For more discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes
24-35, 93, 107-08.
14 See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention in Nineteenth
Century New York, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 726, 729 (2005) [hereinafter Oliver, The Rise and Fall
of MaterialWitness Detention].
15 Among the best analyses of the achievements and limits of the police professionalism
movement are ERIC MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920 (1981); SAMUEL WALKER,
A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977).
16 See MONKKONEN, supra note 15, at 154-55, 158.
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material witness detention in late nineteenth-century New York has minimal
significance.
More central to the history of criminal procedure is the fact that such
detentions continued to occur as part of an investigative strategy of questioning
individuals in secret until they made incriminating statements-without pressing
formal charges against them or granting them court-appointed legal counsel.
Indeed, this Essay will demonstrate that, for more than a century, the field
practices of police and magistrates have been unresponsive to reforms in statutory
and constitutional law or to occasional pressure from the public on behalf of
particular individuals deemed to have knowledge of a crime.
Part II of this Essay explores the detention and questioning of Oscar
Thompson, a Chicago resident at the beginning of the twentieth century, to show
that the detained witness was actually a suspect and that the public disapproved of
the police department's abuse of him. Part III places Thompson's case in the
larger context of material witness detention from the 1800s through the twentiethcentury movement to professionalize the police. Concentrating on California and
Illinois, Part III demonstrates that the actual treatment of detained witnesses often
contravened statutory limits. The public knew about and occasionally criticized
material witness detention. However, as Part Ell shows, such sporadic criticism did
not represent a full-scale reform effort that enjoyed the support of elite activists,
nor did it succeed in changing police practices. The coercive questioning of
detained witnesses thus remained a feature of ordinary crime detection and
prosecution in the twentieth century.
In telling such a story, this Essay seeks, not to defend the Justice
Department's anti-terror tactics, but to suggest that the obsessive focus on
September 11 as a catalyst in the history of criminal procedure obscures ways in
which the gradual consolidation of governmental power over more than a century
has fostered an increasingly coercive and secretive relationship between the
individual and the police.
II. OSCAR THOMPSON'S CASE

The case of a laundry-wagon driver in 1902 provides a vivid example. For
Oscar Thompson, the mysterious death of his landlady led to an exhausting and
terrifying period of detention as a witness in a Chicago police station. On August
9, 1902, investigators discovered the body of Annie Bartholin in the basement of
her home on Calumet Avenue. She had been choked to death.' 7 At first, the police
suspected Annie's son, William, whom they also linked to the murder of his
fianc6e, Minnie Mitchell.18 But William was nowhere to be found. Instead,
9 they
arrested and detained Thompson-Annie's lodger for almost twenty years.'
17 See Mrs. BartholinDead; Body Hid in the Cellar,CIn. TRIB., Aug. 10, 1902, at 1.
18 See id.
'9

See id.
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The official line from Police Chief Francis O'Neill depicted Thompson as an
innocent man who merely might have knowledge of the murders. 20 Yet, this did
not prevent the police from "locking [him] up for safe-keeping" with the stated
goal of holding him until the coroner's inquest. 21 In fact, Thompson languished in
custody for more than a month, and for much of that time, he was not charged with
any crime. When English journalist William T. Stead visited Chicago in the
1890s, he described the Armory Station in the First Precinct as "a reeking, filthy
place, unfit in which to incarcerate a human being. 22 Thompson's cell in the
Englewood Station less than a decade later must have been similar.
Despite initially being deemed a "witness," not a suspect, 23 Thompson was
"put in the sweat box" by interrogators for hours at a time and forced to endure
rigorous, often confrontational questioning designed to produce a confession about
his complicity in the murders of the two women.24 The police believed that his
laundry wagon was used to convey young Minnie's body to the vacant lot where it
the disappearance of the
was dumped. 5 They also found his delay in reporting
26
suspicious.
deeply
Bartholin,
Annie
woman,
older
Intending to "break down the wall of stolidity with which Thompson
surrounded himself since his arrest,, 2 7 interrogating officers repeatedly subjected
him to the now infamous good cop/bad cop routine, 28 in which Inspector Nicholas
Hunt (known for his brutal suppression of the Teamsters' Strike of 1902)
sometimes played the bad cop. 29 The police also staged a number of accusatorial
moments with items of physical evidence and a hostile witness. The day after they
20

See id.

21

See id.

22

RICHARD

C. LINDBERG, To SERVE AND COLLECT:

CHICAGO

POLITICS AND POLICE

CORRUPTION FROM THE LAGER BEER RIOT TO THE SUMMERDALE SCANDAL, 1855-1960 116 (1991)
[hereinafter LINDBERG, To SERVE AND COLLECT].

23

Mrs. Bartholin Dead, supra note 17; Flees for Fear of Bartholin, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11,

1902, at 1.
24 See Mrs. Bartholin Dead, supra note 17, at 1; see also, e.g., Secret Society Aids Bartholin,
CHI. TRiB., Aug. 12, 1902, at 1 (describing how Thompson "was put through severe courses of
questioning" designed to break his statement that he did not know the identity of the killer).
25 See Mrs. BartholinDead,supra note 17, at 1.

26 See Secret Society Aids Bartholin, supranote 24, at 1.
27

Sheds Light on the Batholin Case, CI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1902, at 1.

28

For a discussion of the psychological ploy of the "Mutt and Jeff routine," see Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 452 (1966) (describing a technique involving two officers-one relentless,
unfriendly, and accusatorial and the other "obviously a kindhearted man").
29 See Mrs. Bartholin Dead, supra note 17, at 1 (describing the differing tactics of Chief
O'Neill and the more accusatorial Inspector Hunt); Sheds Light on the Batholin Case, supra note 27,
at 1 ("Lieut. Stephen Wood tried hard to get a statement from Thompson by kind treatment, and

assured him that his course in holding out against all evidence was much against him. This course of
). For a discussion of Inspector Nicholas Hunt's
argument had no more effect than the other ....
role in breaking the Teamsters' Strike in 1902, see LINDBERG, supra note 22, at 73-75.
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discovered the body of Annie Bartholin, for example, they showed Thompson his
own bloodstained shirt "to force him to tell more" about the killings.3 ° Several
days later, they brought him face-to-face with a woman who claimed that, at dawn
on the morning after Minnie Mitchell's disappearance, she overheard Thompson
arguing about a horse and wagon with another man who worked at the laundry's
barn. 3' After a week of such confrontational sessions, investigators were confident
that they had broken Thompson's will and that he would "confess to a share in the
murders." 32 The Chicago Tribune reported that Thompson "is in such a nervous
state that it is feared he will collapse" and also that he begged to be transferred to
the county jail "where he [might] find relief from the trying cross questioning of
the police., 33 Instead, the police continued to badger him and entangle him in
contradictions until, at eleven p.m. on August 14, he promised to "tell all he knew"
if the questioning ceased.34

Hours of psychologically devastating interrogation had converted this
material witness into the key suspect. A few days later, on August 17, Thompson
was formally charged with murdering his landlady, Annie Bartholin, and with
acting as an accessory to the murder of Minnie Mitchell.35 By this time, however,
securing fair treatment for the prisoner had become something of a cause cjlbre.
The owner of the laundry for which Thompson worked filed a habeas corpus
petition on his behalf but agreed to withdraw it when formal charges were
brought.36 Two days later, the Chicago Tribune reported that Thompson's
sympathizers had engaged counsel to represent him
and that one of the lawyers
37
was none other than the esteemed Clarence Darrow.
Thompson's travails took an unexpected turn on September 7 with the
discovery of a suicide note that the dead landlady's son, William Bartholin, had
penned. The note exculpated Thompson and another suspect, a laborer at the
laundry's barn. Yet, even this happy occurrence failed to result in Thompson's
immediate release. Indeed, he spent another ten days in jail because his grand jury
hearing was calendared for later in September. 38 He and the laundry-barn laborer
were finally released on September 17 when the grand jury refused to indict them.
The victory for Thompson was bittersweet and far too late. Threatening to sue the
City of Chicago for damages, he complained:
30

Fleesfor Fearof Bartholin, supra note 23, at 1.

31 Sheds Light on the Bartholin Case, CHi. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1902, at 1.
32

Id.

31

Secret Society Aids Bartholin, CHI. TRM., Aug. 12, 1902, at 5.
Sheds Light on Bartholin Case, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1902, at 1.
Thompson Held to GrandJury, CHI. TRM., Aug. 17, 1902, at A2.

34
35
36

See id.
See Lawyers to Aid MurderSuspect, Cn. TRIB., Aug. 16, 1902, at 2.
38 See PrisonersHopefor Release, Cm. Tam., Sept. 8, 1902, at 2; Bartholin Suspects Freed;
Threaten to Sue City, Cm. Tam., Sept. 17, 1902, at 7.
37
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Even in the days of Roman tyranny . .. a man would not have been

treated as I was. Inspector Hunt kept at me day and night while I was in
the station, trying to force me to say things which I did not know. I knew
nothing about the case. But when they get you in the "sweat box" the
police try to make you admit yourself a villain, no matter if they know
you are innocent.39
III. MATERIAL WITNESSES, INCOMMUNICADO INTERROGATION, AND THE RISE OF

QUASI-LEGAL POLICE POWERS
A. Contextualizing Thompson's Case

Oscar Thompson's travails in Chicago were a small but significant part of a
shift toward greater police powers over the suspect that began in the nineteenth
century. John Langbein correctly contends that the rise of the adversary system

silenced defendants at trial.40 However, as several other legal historians have
shown, this silencing did not extend to the pre-trial phase.4 ' Out of contrition or

hopelessness, less sophisticated suspects continued to talk, and they sometimes
even confessed to crimes they had not committed.42

As long as the magistrate had given a standardized warning, as statutory law
required, courts did not perform a searching analysis of whether the suspect
Moreover, police interrogation became
voluntarily incriminated himself.43
commonplace by the mid-to-late nineteenth century, 44 thus reducing the

significance of the probable-cause hearing as an occasion for magisterial
questioning of suspects.

Enhanced and increasingly secretive police powers

existed in tension with judicial scrutiny of confessions for coercion or

39

Bartholin Suspects Freed; Threaten to Sue City, CHi. TRI., Sept. 17, 1902, at 7.

40

See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 258-61, 266-73

(2003).
41 See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Magistrates' Examinations, Police Interrogations and
Miranda-like Warnings in Nineteenth Century New York, 81 TtL. L. REV. 777, 796-97 (2007)
[hereinafter Oliver, Magistrates' Examinations]; Bruce Smith, Miranda's Prehistory, at 34-40
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
42 See Smith, supra note 41, at 40. This is true today, as well, and it presents one of the most
frustrating realities of Miranda'sprophylactic scheme. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation
Room, 86 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 (1996) (finding a waiver rate of seventy-eight percent
among suspects informed of their Miranda rights); George C. Thomas I, Stories About Miranda,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 2000 (2004) (concluding, based on empirical study, that "warnings do not
change suspect behavior in any significant way"); WELSH WHrrE, MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECIONS
9 (2001) (arguing that manipulative police tactics and subsequent decisions by the Rehnquist and
Burger Courts rendered Miranda ineffective at protecting suspects).
43 See Smith, supra note 41, at 43-44.
44

See Oliver, Magistrates'Examinations,supra note 41, at 796-97.
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inducements.4 5 Yet, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, police
conduct in questioning suspects and witnesses was less rigorously scrutinized than
magistrates' procedures were because officers were not required to give warnings
and defense lawyers were rarely present to observe interrogation practices.
The rise of police interrogation and the assertion by law enforcement of quasilegal, investigatory powers figured prominently in Thompson's case and those of
many other individuals detained as witnesses in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. This Essay concentrates on the treatment of such witnesses in Illinois
and California and thus builds on the research that Oliver has done on the practice
in New York. Taken together, this historical work on material witness detention
illustrates how incommunicado police interrogation largely supplanted questioning
by magistrates and allowed officers to "work up" cases against individuals before
designating them as defendants or even as suspects.
The plight of detained witnesses might seem like either a frightening twentyfirst century innovation or a holdover from a pre-modem stage in Anglo-American
history when geographic distance and poor communications made confining
individuals in jail cells the only means of insuring their appearance in court. In
reality, it was neither. Rather, material witness detention's resilience as a crimesolving strategy had much to do with the modem state that began to take shape in
the second half of the nineteenth century.
B. The Limits of Statutory Authorization to Detain Witnesses

At least in theory, material witnesses were detained, either in regular jails or
in special witness-detention facilities, to insure their appearance at trial. There was
no common-law basis for the practice,46 nor did the primary authority to detain
witnesses reside with the police. Rather, it loosely derived from the same sixteenth
century English statute that required magistrates to examine criminal suspects
before trial. 47 Under early modem English law, it was the justice of the peace, not
the constable, who was required to make a record of pre-trial evidence and to
insure the appearance of prosecution witnesses in court. Moreover, the English
statute only instructed the justice of the peace to "bind all such by Recognizance or
Obligation, as do declare anything material to prove the said Murder or

45 Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 565 (1897) (holding that an involuntary
confession was wrongfully admitted at a federal trial in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
Nineteenth-century state courts also examined confessions for voluntariness, though Oliver suggests
that state courts may have become more permissive towards deceitful, high-pressure police tactics as
the century progressed. Oliver, Magistrates'Examinations,supra note 41, at 780-81, 810-21.

46 See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1971) ("Of the state courts that
have considered the question, a majority have held that in the absence of statutory authority there is
no common law power to detain witnesses before disobedience of a subpoena.").
47 Marian Bail Statute, 1 & 2 Philip and Mary c.13 (1554-1555), reprinted in JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRiME iN THE RENAissANcE: ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANcE 257 (1974).
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Manslaughter Offenses or Felonies." It did not expressly give him the power to
Rather, in England and colonial America, a
jail witnesses pending trial.
to
the
Crown (or the state) if the witness failed to
became
a
debt
recognizance
49
appear.
In contrast, when similar laws were adopted in the United States after the
American Revolution, they did include clear authority for the judge, at his
discretion, to incarcerate recalcitrant witnesses. The legal history of material
witness detention in Illinois, the state in which Thompson was held, illustrates this
difference. It also shows that, by the time of Thompson's 1902 case, police and
magistrates had begun to exceed their statutory powers.
In Illinois in 1845, judges were required to bind witnesses to appear at the
next circuit court, and
[i]f any person, upon being required to enter into recognizance.., shall
refuse, it shall be lawful for such judge or justice of the peace to commit
him or her to jail, there to remain until he or she shall enter into such
recognizance or be otherwise discharged by due course of law.5°
Illinois judges apparently interpreted this language to mean that they could require
a witness to provide sureties for the amount of his recognizance and to jail him if
he could not comply. The judges' assumption may have been based on the legal
procedures of other states. For example, the bench in California enjoyed express
statutory power to demand financial security and to incarcerate witnesses who
refused to provide it.5' Illinois law developed differently, however.
In 1874, the Illinois legislature clarified the material witness detention statute
and brought it into line with federal law. The amended Illinois Criminal Code now
provided that "no ... witness shall be required to give other security than his own
recognizance for [his] appearance. 52 In other words, under Illinois law, a witness
could only be jailed for refusing to promise that he would appear, but not for
failing to provide sureties. This clarification presumably responded to public
criticism of the inequality and hardship faced by poor, friendless witnesses who
could not post bond.53
48

ld.

49

Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention, supra note 14, at 731 (citing

JuLIus GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A

STUDY INCRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664--1776), at 507-18 (1970)).
50 ILL. CRIM. JUR. Div. 18, ch. 30, § 204 (1845).
51 California's law on this issue remained unchanged from its early statehood until at least the
1930s. See CAL. SEss. L., tit. 3, §§ 170-173 (1851); CAL. PENAL CODE pt. 2, §§ 878-881 (1872);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 878-881 (1901); CAL. PENAL CODE pt §§ 878-881 (1906); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 878-881 (1915); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 878-881 (1920); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 878-881 (1931).
52 ILL. CRIM. CODE ch. 38, § 364 (1874).
53

See infra text accompanying note 125; cf. infra text accompanying note 124 (noting such
criticisms in New York). Unfortunately, the floor debates of the Illinois legislature were not
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It also harmonized Illinois law with federal provisions, dating back to the
First Judiciary Act of 1789, which "limited the courts' authority to imprison a
witness to instances when ... [he] willfully refused to promise to appear., 54 At
least until 1948, a refusal to promise, not a refusal to pay, was the only behavior
that could lawfully land a federal witness in jail.55 According to statutory law,
neither federal witnesses nor their counterparts in Illinois could be required to give
sureties.5 6 There is no evidence that Oscar Thompson refused to sign a
recognizance, as required by Illinois law. In fact, at one point, the police even
rejected his employer's offer to post bond for him. 57 Hence, his detention in 1902
exceeded the permissible power of the courts or the police to hold him.
California continued to allow sureties to be required but established an
alternate procedure whereby witnesses who could not give sureties might be
deposed in the presence of the defendant, instead of being jailed.58 Furthermore,
from its inception in 1849, the California Constitution specifically admonished that
no witnesses could be unreasonably restrained 59 -language that provided a basis
for successful habeas corpus petitions by a few detainees fortunate enough to have
lawyers. 6° By 1931, the California Constitution also included language barring the
61
confinement of witnesses "in any room where criminals are actually imprisoned.,

preserved, so historians are can only conjecture about the rationale behind the revised material
witness provisions.
54 Bascuas, supra note 2, at 707.

55 See id.
56 See id.
57 Couple Edwards with Bartholin,CHI. TRB., Aug. 15, 1902, at 1.

58 The earliest mention of the deposition procedure in California appears in 1851. See CAL.
SEss. L., tit. III, § 174 (1851). This provision remained on the books into the twentieth century but

was modified so that it did not apply to homicide witnesses. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 882
(1931).
59 CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. 1, § 6.
60 Ex parte Dressier, 7 P. 645 (Cal. 1885) (holding that 90-day detention of petitioner due to
unexplained continuances violated the state constitution). See also Pugilist Freed as Witness to
GarageKilling, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1926, at Al (reporting the release on habeas corpus of
Pico Ramies, who had been held in county jail as a material witness to a murder); Released on Bail,

L. A. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1905, at H6 (reporting the release on habeas corpus of Refugio Ochoa, a
material witness in a rape case). Cf In re Prestigiacomo, 234 A.D. 300 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932)
(ordering the release of a witness held without a showing that he posed a flight risk or that his
testimony was needed for a specific criminal case, aside from a trumped-up "John Doe" case filed to

facilitate his detention); In re Lewellyn, 62 N.W. 554 (Mich. 1895) (granting writ of habeas corpus to
a witness who had been held five months in county jail without a hearing and without being housed
separately from those charged or convicted of crimes); State ex rel Howard, 18 Minn. 398 (1872)
(deeming detention of witness simply because he could not pay bail to be unjust and oppressive).
61 CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. 1, §6.
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C. Material Witness Detention in Practice
1. Length and Conditions of Confinement
As American practice took shape, however, it deviated from the protections
provided by statute and by state and federal constitutions. In jailhouses around the
nation, the detention of material witnesses was not limited to uncooperative
individuals who refused to give their recognizance or who were held briefly
pending a formal deposition. Rather, police seemed to operate above the law by
prolonging the detention and interrogation of those connected with a crime scene.
If such individuals were accorded a formal hearing, many magistrates simply
rubber-stamped the officer's determination that a flight risk existed. Constitutional
and statutory provisions establishing deposition procedures, in lieu of
incarceration, for witnesses in California appear to have been under-used. And
reports of witnesses held under very high bonds-hundreds and even thousands of
dollars-regularly appeared in the Chicago Tribune well into the twentieth
century,62 despite the 1874 statute that made requiring sureties illegal in Illinois.63
In both California and Illinois, police routinely held all homicide witnesses
until the coroner's inquest occurred. 64 Those detained in relation to murders and
other offenses included children, as well as adult men and women. Minors were
typically victims of crimes, including statutory rape,65 or had witnessed an intimate
62

See, e.g., Day's Development in the Case, CHl. TRM., May 3, 1890, at 1 (reporting that four

men were being held at the Criminal Court under $3,000 bond in a state election fraud case); Arrest
12 Men for Fire Horrorat the Iroquois, CI. TRm., January 1, 1904, at G1 (stating that the Assistant
Chief of Police arrested chorus girls and other members of a theatrical company and held them on
$300 bond after they witnessed a theater fire that killed more than 500 people).
63 ILL. CRIM. CODE, ch. 38, sec. 364 (1874).
64 It was a Fatal Wound, Cm. TRm., Feb. 1, 1890, at 2 ("The Coroner said that in murder
cases it was customary to have important witnesses detained until an inquest could be held.").
Holding murder witnesses pending an inquest also seems to have been a common practice in
California. See Sailor Seized in Death Fray,L. A. TIMES, May 9, 1929, at A2 (reporting that several
young women and sailors would be held pending the inquest into the death of a Filipino man shot by
a sailor in a jealous quarrel); Jury Finds Homicide Justified, L.A. TtMEs, May 5, 1928, at B7
(reporting that two young witnesses to a homicide were released after a coroner's jury determined the
killing to be self-defense); Fight Too Much for Striker's Heart, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1919, at 19
(reporting that a strike-breaker who was involved in a fight with a striking shipyard worker who later
died would be held as a witness pending the coroner's inquest); Bullets End Lives of Man and
Woman, L. A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1903, at 1 ("Arthur M. Laurie, with whom the dead woman had made
her home, will be held by the police until after the inquest. There is no evidence connecting him with
the shooting, but he is detained as a witness.").
65 See City News in Brief: Why is a Detention Home?, L.A. TImEs, June 3, 1913, at 116
(reporting that five girls under the age of sixteen who were being held as "witnesses against men
accused of statutory crimes" nearly escaped from the detention rooms of the juvenile court by prying
the lock off the door); BrutallyAssaulted a Boy, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1895 (stating that a fourteenyear-old boy was "locked up to be held as witness" after being brutally beaten by six men); Items,
CHi. TRm., Dec. 16, 1882, at 11 (noting that an eleven-year-old girl has been held as a witness against
her father, who allegedly has assaulted her). In 1948, the Los Angeles Times reported that, between
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murder or another offense involving a family member. 66 However, the police
suspected some of the juvenile witnesses, like their adult counterparts, of being
perpetrators or accomplices.67
The length of detention of material witnesses varied widely. Some were only
held for a couple of days; 68 others languished in jail for months. 69 In California in
1913, a federal trial judge expressed dismay when he learned that three Chinese
men had been held as witnesses in the San Diego County jail for nearly two
years.7 °

The conditions of the witnesses' confinement were difficult and even
dangerous because many were housed with the general population of convicts and
criminal defendants. One California man committed suicide rather than undergo a
second period of detention in the "foul and fetid den" of the Sacramento Jail. 71
Other witnesses lost their jobs 72 and even their health.73 In both California and

Illinois, jailhouse detentions continued until at least the mid-twentieth century.
1945 and 1947, 421 juveniles were detained as witnesses in that city and that the majority of these
detentions related to "serious sex crimes" perpetrated by adult offenders. Plight of Juvenile
Witnesses Told, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1948, at Cl.
66 See Woman is Shot by Husband During Quarrel at Home, CHI. TRB., May 5, 1906, at 5
(stating than an eight-year-old girl was being held as a witness after her adoptive father shot and
seriously injured her adoptive mother); Aged Woman is Murdered, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27, 1900, at 3
(reporting that a twelve-year-old boy was under arrest as a witness in the murder of his mother).
67 See, e.g., Escapefrom the Armory: A Boy Held as Witness Jumps Twenty Feet, and Secures
Freedom, C-n. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1870 (reporting on the escape of a fourteen-year-old boy who had been
held as a witness in a burglary case and "induced to testify against his companions").
68 In California, a passenger in a fatal car crash "was held over night in the County Jail as a
witness for the Coroner's inquest." Bay City Man Held in Death, L. A. TIMES, July 1, 1924, at 10.
Witness detentions in Chicago sometimes aroused criticism even if they were relatively short. See
Police Stupidity, CHn. TRIB., Feb. 7, 1885, at 8 (presenting a sympathetic account of a robbery victim
whom the police detained in a jail cell for five days). When the victim-witness complained, a police
justice said "the officers who had detained him should certainly be censured." Id.
69 Federal Law v. Romance, L. A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1907, at III (recounting the travails of a
young woman held in the county jail for eleven months under orders of the U.S. Department of
Justice after the defendant in the case jumped bail); The Hesper Murderers, L.A. TIMES, May 28,
1894, at 2 (reporting that nine men were held on Alcatraz Island for fifteen months as witnesses to a
murder on the high seas); The Courts, L. A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1883, at 4 (recording that a witness was
awarded $60 after being detained in county jail for forty-seven days); County Affairs, CHI. TRtB., Apr.
22, 1873, at 3 (printing a communication from a witness, who has been detained for more than two
months in county jail and who "has lost a position thereby"); The Gregory Case-Detaining
Witnesses, CHI. TRB., Oct. 14, 1859, at 1 ("The young man Gregory who being poor and friendless
was unable to give recognizances for his appearances, has been a prisoner in our jail for nearly three
months on common jail fare.").
70 See On Their Way: Chinese Long Held in Jail,L. A. TIMES, May 2, 1913, at H8.
71 MiscarriagesofJustice, L.A. TIMEs, June 26, 1909, at H4.
72 See County Affairs, supra note 69 (printing a communication from a witness, who has been
detained for more than two months in county jail and who "has lost a position thereby").
" The City in Brief L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1872, at 6 (reporting that a victim-witness suffered
health problems after a long detention).
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Hotels, offices, wayward women's homes, and juvenile halls were also used to
hold witnesses,74 but separate public detention facilities, such as those built in New
York City in 1857, 75 did not exist in many cities. In 1873, the Chicago Tribune
complained about "the outrageous practice of using the same jail for detaining as
witnesses persons who have been guilty of no crime, those who are incarcerated to
wait trial and who may be innocent, and those who are serving out punishment
under verdicts. 76 According to the Tribune, "The practice, from all accounts,
extends pretty generally to all cities." 7
Yet, despite such calls for county

governments to fund the construction of separate detention centers, or for private
entities to provide better housing for witnesses, 78 the use of un-segregated jail
facilities continued. For example, as late as 1948, the Los Angeles Times
complained that minor children held as witnesses were "forced to use the same
facilities delinquents use... ,,79
2. The Blurred Line Between Witness and Suspect

Sources from Illinois and California in the 1850s through the 1930s indicate
that the majority of detainees were either complaining victims or other witnesses
who simply could not post bond and that they remained in jail until a specific event
(e.g. the inquest or the trial) had concluded.80 The flight-risk rationale probably
did underpin many material witness detentions in the past. However, in a
significant minority of cases, another motive emerged: the interrogation of
individuals whom the police lacked probable cause to charge with a crime but
whom they suspected of being accomplices or principals. 81 Oliver has
74

3 Young Crime Pupils Accuse a Modern Fagin, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 30 ,1938 at 2 (juvenile
home); Ex-Police Officer in New Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1924, at A14 (juvenile hall); Death and
Theft Mystery Revived; Suspect Held, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1915, at HI (hotel); Skipper Cecil Falls
A-foul, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1912, at H9 (office of the Chief of Police in Santa Barbara, CA); From
the Erring Women's Refuge, Cm. TRm., Feb. 25, 1890, at 10 (erring women's refuge).
75 See Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention, supra note 14, at 754. See
also Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1330 n. 110 (2002) (noting the existence of a House of
Detention for Witnesses in late nineteenth-century New York City).
76 Untitled Article, Ci. TRm., May 15, 1873, at 4.
77

Id.

78

See id.; Better Accommodations Neededfor Witnesses, Cm. TRm., Feb. 23, 1890, at 12.

79 Plight ofJuvenile Witnesses Told, supra note 64.
80 See supra text accompanying note 64 (discussing the routine practice of holding homicide
witnesses until the coroner's inquest had occurred).
81 See, e.g., supra Part II (describing Oscar Thompson's case) and infra notes 84, 93, 107-09,
114 (providing examples of suspected witnesses). Like Thompson, some individuals arrested as
witnesses subsequently faced criminal charges. For example, police in California arrested Dave
Hearns as a material witness to a fatal stabbing and held him, without formal charges, pending a
coroner's inquest. Slashed Vein is Declared Cause of Venice Death, L.A. TIMES, April 8, 1924, at 2.
Heams was later charged with murder for the "love duel," while the woman over whom the accused
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demonstrated that, in New York City by the 1840s, "[p]rofessional law
enforcement officers, more vigilant in their prosecution of crime than their
constable and night-watch predecessors, began to detain persons who were not
charged with crimes." 82 To evade legislation barring the detention of a suspect
without a charge, newly zealous police took advantage of statutory authority
allowing them to hold witnesses. 83 This manipulation of witness detention statutes
led to abuse in Illinois, California, and other states as well, and the abuse continued
into the twentieth century. For example, in Los Angeles in 1913, a nurse held as a
witness against a notorious swindler was kept in the City Jail for "further quizzing"
because the police envisioned her as "the brains of [the swindler's] operations." 84
Did the detentions stem from fear that the detainees might commit more
crimes upon release? One answer is that few, if any, witnesses were held
preventively due to formal, scientific predictions about their future dangerousness.
In this respect, Levenson may correctly identify a gradual transformation of the
practice. Although Levenson errs in assuming that, historically, witnesses were
not treated as potential suspects, her insight that "the War on Terrorism has
capitalized"
on American society's comfort with preventive detention has some
85

validity.

An important caveat, of course, is that September 11 did not start the trend

toward preventive detention.86 Actuarial methods have influenced criminal justice
administration since the 1930s, or even the 1920s, when prediction tools developed
by University of Chicago sociologists began to shape parole decision-making.87
and the deceased fought continued to be held as a witness. HearingDate Set for FatalLove Quarrel,
L.A. TIMES, April 12, 1924. Law enforcers also arrested illegal immigrants as witnesses during
border-control efforts or because they were believed to have knowledge of other crimes. These
individuals were later deported. See infra notes 97-98.
82 Oliver, The Rise and Fall ofMaterial Witness Detention, supra note 14, at 740.
83 See

8

id.

85

Eternal Three Faceto Face, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1913, at 15.
See Levenson, supra note 2, at 1218-20.

86

September 11 at most accelerated the growth of a troubling thicket of police practices and

sentencing authority that now encompasses criminal profiling, habitual-offender laws, and the civil
confinement of convicted sex offenders who have completed their prison terms. The profiling of
potential aircraft hijackers and drug smugglers became an established tool of law enforcement in the
1960s and 1970s, if not earlier. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING,
POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 103-05 (2007). Criminal incapacitation, based on
past offending and projections of future dangerousness, was also a controversial practice in many
states prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks. See Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes
Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes & Criminal Incapacitation,87 GEO. L.J. 103 (1998);
Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive
Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778 (1996); Stephen Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay
on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113 (1996); Carolyn B. Ramsey, California's Sexually
Violent PredatorAct: The Role of Psychiatrists,Courts, and Medical Determinations in Confining
Sex Offenders, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 469 (1999).
87 See HARcOURT, supra note 86, at 47-48, 59, 69.
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Moreover, although criminal profiling did not emerge as a formal law enforcement
strategy until the 1960s, "it arguably had antecedents in the early-twentieth century
eugenics movement. 88 As discussed below, police officers routinely took such
factors as race into account in identifying individuals to be held as witnesses89-a
practice that dovetailed with the increasing criminological emphasis of the 1920s
and 1930s on social typing as a means of predicting criminality. 9°
a. Class, Ethnicity, and Profiling
The police often possessed very slim evidence connecting the witness to the
alleged crime. They may have had no more than the feeling that they did not like
his looks and wanted to inquire into his character-the reported grounds for
detaining a man in connection with an attempted train robbery in Illinois in the
early 1890s. 91 Racial or ethnic stereotypes frequently substituted for hard facts
indicating that the detainee had information to impart. For instance, during the
Prohibition Era, police targeted Asians suspected of illegal alcohol or gambling
operations. In such cases, large groups of individuals-whether Chinese or
Japanese-were indiscriminately rounded up as "witnesses" 92 and later deported.
Other types of profiling occurred as well. For example, law enforcers sometimes
made assumptions based on an individual's occupation. In a memorable California
case, the police arrested two individuals as material witnesses to a murder simply
because they walked with a "sailor's roll" and the murder victim was supposed to
have kept an "open house" for seafaring men. The officers found a small quantity
of marijuana on one of the sailors and thus were able
to charge him with a drug
93
crime. They continued to hold his mate as a witness.
Thus, while there is little evidence that material witness detentions were
largely preventive measures based on formal actuarial methods, the tendency of
investigating officers to use such factors as race, employment, and marital status as
barometers for involvement in crime resonates with the reliance of sociologists and
parole boards on social typing in the first half of the twentieth century. Parole
decisions during this period often favored the white and the married.94 And the
sociologists who developed the first prediction tools relied on categories as
subjective as "recent immigrant," "substantial citizen," "ne'er-do-well," and
Id. at 103.
89 See infra text accompanying note 92.
88

90 See HARCOURT, supra note 86, at 180-83.
91 Wreck Barely Averted, Cm. TRIm., Sept. 15, 1891, at 1.
92 See, e.g., Japanese "Blind Pigs," L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 9,

1908,

at H6.; Special

Correspondenceof The Times, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1908.
93 Two Sailors Seized as Suspects in Brutal Murder of San Pedro Clothing Merchant, L.A.

TIMEs, Dec. 20, 1929, at A2.
94 See HARCOURT, supra note 86, at 69 (discussing the findings of a 1939 inquiry into the
federal parole system).
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It was perhaps not a
"country bully" to understand the criminal mind.95
coincidence that Illinois and California-two states in which material witness
detention was a prevalent police tactic-also ranked as pioneers in the use of
actuarial methods to predict the dangerousness of parole candidates.
The profiling of certain groups both arose from and reinforced stereotypes
about their likely guilt. Moreover, in border and port cities, witness detention
became a close ally of deportation. For example, in California, Chinese persons
were often held as witnesses in federal smuggling cases, prior to being deported
along with other smuggled aliens. 96 Despite public sympathy for the financial
woes of many detainees, the government incurred criticism for paying the Chinese
smuggling witnesses a dollar per day during their stay in county jail "if their
evidence [was] wanted ....
This lack of sympathy for Asians and other foreign witnesses on the West
Coast contrasts with the situation in New York, where Oliver contends that
politically powerful immigrant communities, such as the Irish and the Germans,
pressed for the abolition of material witness detention.98 The temporary success of
a reform campaign fueled by politicians' desire to woo immigrant voters had no
parallel in California or other western states. There, reformers expressed concern
for the welfare of almost all witnesses, except the foreign-born. The contrast likely
arose from the differing composition of west-coast cities. In Los Angeles, for
example, "machine politicians, venal policemen, civic reformers and the electorate
were mainly native-born, white, middle class Protestant Republicans," and there
was correspondingly less pressure to respond to immigrant interests than in New

95 See id.at 180-83 (describing the work of sociologists Ernest Burgess, George Vold, and
Ferris Laune).
96 See, e.g., Double Hoodoo on Prisoners,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1914, at 113 ("The thirty
contrabands were landed on the sand... about daylight, and it is the contention of the government
that [the defendant] was on the beach with his auto, ready to load them in and bring them to Los
Angeles ....The Chinese were afterward captured by immigration authorities, and all except two or
three who are held as witnesses, were deported to China."); Chinese are Deported, L.A. TtMES, Dec.
20, 1911, at 13 (reporting that five Chinese persons would be held as witnesses in a San Francisco
smuggling case, while more than twenty had been shipped back to China on an ocean liner); Deport
Chinese By Wholesale, L. A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1911, at IV12 (stating that sixty-five Chinese had been
ordered deported, but that "twenty are being detained as witnesses in the five smuggling cases that
[were] set for hearing" in the United States District Court); Coolies, L. A. TIMES, June 24, 1909, at 13
(reporting that several smuggled Chinese were held as witnesses in Seattle, while others had been
deported). Similarly, an approving report from Denver revealed that "sweeping investigations" by an
immigration agent of all penal institutions in the state would result in the "[w]holesale deportation of
criminals, anarchists" and other "notorious 'reds,"' some of whom were being held as witnesses.
Undesirable Citizens: Colorado to Deport Five Hundred Reds, Direct Wire to the Times, L. A.
TIMES, May 26, 1908, at 14.
97 Dig at Officers Draws Reprimand, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1914, at 112. See On Their Way:
Chinese Long Held in Jail,supra note 70, at 118 (noting the "roll of coin collected from Uncle Sam"
by Chinese witnesses held in a San Diego Jail for nearly two years).
98 Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention, supra note 14, at 777, 780.
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York or Chicago.99 Despite evidence that the criminal classes in California were

also predominantly white and native-born, the public often associated urban
which made the plight of the Chinese detainees seem
criminality with immigration,
°°
less sympathetic.'
b. Coercive Tactics
A major argument of this Essay is that, instead of constituting a watershed in
criminal procedure, the Justice Department's response to the September 11
terrorist attacks merely extended a historical trajectory toward state-imposed
coercion that had been operating for more than a century. Coercion has long been
a feature of police interaction with witnesses. Indeed, the lack of separate
detention facilities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries magnified
the likelihood that suspected individuals officially labeled as "witnesses" would be
held under incommunicado conditions. This happened to a lodger in Los Angeles
whose landlady's corpse turned up in a vacant lot. Booked under a fictitious name,
the lodger was secretly held first at the University Police Station and then at the
City Jail.10 1 Such witnesses were frequently subjected to rigorous questioning
without being brought before a magistrate. Moreover, interrogating officers
employed coercive tactics to force the detainee either to confess or to incriminate
others. In 1892, the Chicago Tribune reported that two witnesses to a saloon
killing were "put through the regular 'sweat box' by the officers" to make them
suggesting that the confrontational
divulge the murderer's name ° -thus
encounters, Mutt-and-Jeff routines, and prolonged questioning that Thompson
faced in 1902103 were already widespread a decade earlier.
Perhaps most importantly, officers questioning a person held as a witness
always told him that he was a witness, not a suspect, regardless of the officers'
subjective belief about the detainee's criminal involvement. Interrogators certainly
do not seem to have given such detainees warnings, even when their main
objective was to secure incriminating statements. Outside the context of terrorism,
police today typically Mirandize a material witness before subjecting him to
custodial interrogation. 1 4 Of course, "custody" is determined using a totality-of99 GERALD WOODS, THE POLICE IN Los ANGELES: REFORM AND PROFESSIONALIZATION 4
(1993) (indicating that the political machine in Los Angeles was not the "product of immigrant
cultures"). In contrast, after the Civil War, Chicago was dominated by "a coalition of loosely
affiliated ward organizations composed of immigrants." LINDBERG, To SERVE AND COLLECr, supra
note 22, at 35. For a brief description of machine politics in New York, see Ramsey, The
DiscretionaryPower of "Public" Prosecutorsin HistoricalPerspective, supra note 75, at 1338-40.
100 See WOODS, supra note 99, at 4.
101 See Bare Fearful Story of Mrs. Kennedy's Death, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1914, at Hi.
102 To Probe a Mystery, CHI.TRIB., Dec. 28, 1892, at 3 (emphasis added).

103 See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
104 See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541,

1550, 1560 (D. Colo. 1996)

(noting that Terry Nichols received Miranda warnings before being questioned as a material witness
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the-circumstances test that deems questioning at the scene of the crime or even at
the police station,
if the witness voluntarily accompanies the officers there, to be
"non-custodial."10 5 However, in the nineteenth century and the first half of the
twentieth, there were not
even any prophylactic rules of this sort shielding
°6
witnesses from coercion.'
The interrogation of suspects, under the subterfuge that they were merely
witnesses, sometimes allowed the police to get a confession in that case. In
Chicago in 1902, for example, two boys held as witnesses for three days

"weakened .. .and confessed that they themselves were the murderers" of a

grocery clerk.107 Similarly, a woman whom police held as a material witness to a
drowning death confessed that she pushed the victim off a yacht. 10 8 Other times,
the officer detained an individual as a witness to one crime but subjected him to
rigorous questioning that revealed he might be guilty of an entirely different
offense. For instance, a man detained in regard to a Chicago saloon shooting was
also questioned about the murder of a Northwestern University student whose
killer he resembled.l°09

in the Oklahoma City bombing case and stating in dicta, "it is assumed that the rights of a person in
custody as a material witnesses are, in this respect, identical with those of a person arrested as a
suspect"); State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1316-17 (N.J. 1990) (stating that an individual held as a
material witness was given Miranda warnings); State v. Sugar, 417 A.2d 474, 475-76 (N.J. 1980)
(same); State v. Neeley, 244 S.E.2d 522, 527 (S.C. 1978) (same); Walker v. State, 560 P.2d 1040,
1041-42 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (same); Comm. v. Edwards, 353 A.2d 462, 462 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1975) (same). But see United States v. Anfield, 539 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The custody of
appellant as a material witness was not of the type requiring Miranda warnings.").
105 See State v. Faircloth, No. A03-468, 2004 WL 1152479, at *2-4 (Minn. Ct. App. May 25,
2004) (holding that, based on the totality of circumstances, a material witness whom the police took
to the police station was not "in custody"); State v. Harris, 725 P.2d 975, 978 (Wash. 1986)
("[P]ersons voluntarily accompanying police to the police station as material witnesses are not under
custodial interrogation if their freedom of action is not curtailed to a degree associated with a formal
arrest."); State v. Green, 588 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (Wash. 1979) (indicating that the police need not
Mirandize a material witness whom they have taken to the police station, as long as the witness is
"free to leave" and the investigation has not focused on him as a suspect). Cf.People v. Riddle, 83
Cal. App. 3d 563, 579 (holding that material witness may be questioned in custody without Miranda
warnings if an extreme emergency exists).
106Nor had the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
clause applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, though states had widely adopted the
privilege in their own constitutions and laws. Twining v. New Jersey, 29 S.Ct. 14, 16, 26 (1908).
Moreover, at this time, the privilege was not generally considered to apply to police interrogations.
107Boy Prisoners Confess Murder, Cim. TRIB, Feb. 19, 1902, at 5.
108 Woman's Conscience Forces a Confession, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1902, at 10 (reporting the
details of a New Orleans, Louisiana incident).
109Carville Gives Himself Up ForHurley Killing, CtI. TaRu., Mar. 20, 1920, at 5.
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3. The Relationship of Detention to Social or Political Crises
It does not appear that the detention of witnesses-either those actually
suspected of crimes or those held solely to ensure their testimony at trial-arose as
a direct response to crisis. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some
correlation existed between the arrest of certain types of witnesses and changing
social conditions.
For example, the passage of the Mann Act regulating
prostitution and immorality resulted in a spate of arrests of young women in the
1910s and 1920s as witnesses against alleged Mann Act violators." 0 And as we
have seen, concern about the influx of illegal immigrants to states like California
led to a growing connection between material witness detention and deportation
efforts.'
However, when viewed over time, the arrest of witnesses generally did
not occur in isolated spurts in response to actual or perceived criminal-justice
alarms.
Here, my research differs from Oliver's. Oliver suggests that material witness
detention arose in New York in response "to a wave of a particular type of crime,
petty thefts, specifically swindles" which victimized people from outside the city
and necessitated holding them to ensure their appearance at trial." 2 By contrast, in
California and Illinois, the detention of so-called "witnesses" seems to have been a
routine and steadily increasing 1 3 part of law enforcement that most often affected
110 Mann Act Case Has New Angles, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1914, at 113; Held as a Witness: SelfStyled Victim of Alleged White Slaver Finds That She Must Also Put up a Fat Bond, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
6, 1915, at 113; Cupid in Trouble: He's Charged with Baiting Love Trap for Country Girl and
BetrayingHer to Tia Juana, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1915, at 115; Wife Pleads To Go To Jail in Fear of
Persecutors,CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1916, at 5; U.S. Will Investigate Petrie-HansenRomance, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 4, 1917; Girls Like Phone Romance; Balk at Elopement, Cm. TRIB., April 19, 1920, at 17;
Woman to Testify in Mann Act Case, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1922, at 113; Detectives Use Guns to
Obtain Girl as Witness, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1923, at 112; Toledo Man to FaceMann Act Charge in
East, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1924, at B7; Officers Make Good Promises: Find Woman for Man Now
Held to Answer Long List of Charges, L.A. TIMES, Feb 6, 1925, at 9; Mann Act Case Girl Gives
Bond: Bail in $5000 Providedfor Bessie Pritchett as White Slave Witness, L.A. TIMES, April 17,
1925, at A2; Girl Accuser Held in Mann Act Case, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1925, at A2; Girl Put in
County Jail as Witness: Tale of Auto Ride Started in Utah Investigated in Mann Act Case, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1926, at A2; Trip Herefrom East Jails Man: Chicago Promoter Taken as White Slave
Suspect; Girl Held as Witness, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1926, at A6; Canadian to Face Mann Act
Charge: Wealthy Rancher Arrested in Pasadena While Niece Held as Witness, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1926, at A9; Mann Act Case Deny Charges, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 1926, at A2; Mann Act Accusation
Nets Pair:Man Placed Under Arrest at Santa Barbara While Girl Faces Questioning, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1926, at A3; Chinese Wife ofFederal Official in Mann Act, Net, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1926,
at 11; Mann-Act Charge Holds Portlander,L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1927, at A8; Parked Car Leads Wife
to Husband: She Also Finds Girls and Companion with Mate and All Four Go to Jail, L.A. TIMES,
March 20, 1928, at A2.
"'

See supra text accompanying note 96.

112 Oliver, The Rise and Fallof Material Witness Detention, supra note 14, at 741.

113 Oliver reports that witness detentions in New York rose from less than one hundred in 1848
to more than six hundred per year by the 1870s. See id. at 746, 781. Nevertheless, by his estimate,
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those deemed to possess information about murders, robberies, prostitution, and
other ordinary street crimes.' 14 No specific crisis is evident in the genesis of the
5
practice in these two states."1
The investigative tactic of detaining witnesses had spread across the nation by
the end of the nineteenth century. Yet, rather than being a stop-gap response to a
particular type of threat, this development seems to have been the practical result
of key features of the nascent institutionalized state-the existence of a full-time
police force with fewer disincentives to solve crimes than in the past,' 6 as well as

"[w]itnesses were held in only a small fraction of the total number of criminal cases in the nineteenth
century." Id. at 763. Such data is corroborated by my largely anecdotal evidence from Los Angeles.
For example, in 1890, the Los Angeles Times reported that, of 2575 arrests in the city that year, only
thirty-six witnesses were detained. Police Business: The Annual Report of the Chief Submitted, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1890, at 3. While the charity functions of the police began to decline in the late
nineteenth century, the number of lodgers accommodated, sick and wounded persons receiving
medical treatment, and lost children restored to their parents still exceeded witness detentions in
1890. See id. However, neither newspaper articles nor police blotters provide very reliable
quantitative data due to the secret nature of some witness detentions and interrogations. See infra text
accompanying note 151 (discussing this research problem).
14 My research yielded hundreds of newspaper articles about cases fitting each of these
categories between the 1850s and the 1940s. Listing all of them is beyond the scope of this Essay. In
the sub-category of witnesses whom the police suspected of committing crimes, the cases ran the
gamut from murder and robbery to burglary and fraud. See, e.g., Arrest in Langley Killing, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1924, at Al (noting that detectives indicated more serious charges might be brought
against a material witness held in connection with a theater robbery-murder); Admits Seeing Hickey
Murder, CHI. TRt., April 20, 1903, at 2 (reporting that both the police and a psychiatric examiner
thought a material witness had concealed facts about a murder and that he might be "the guilty
man"); Sold Tickets Twice, CHI. TRIB., May 10, 1893, at 1 (stating that "nothing so far ascertained"
showed that a material witness whom detectives pumped for information had criminal responsibility
for a fraudulent ticket-selling scheme); Escape from the Armory, supra note 67 (reporting that a
juvenile witness provided evidence against his fellow burglars). See also supra Part II (discussing
Oscar Thompson's case), and text accompanying notes 64, 67, 93, 107-09, 110 (providing additional
examples).
11-5Material witness detention thus may shed light on a broader debate about the
professionalization of the police. Several prominent historians argue that riots and disorder were the
precipitating factors in the advent of police forces and other institutions, such as professional fire
departments and full-time, salaried district attorneys. See STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 119-20, 164;
see also WALKER, supra note 15, at 4 ("The new police were born of conflict and violence, as a direct
consequence of an unprecedented wave of civil disorders that swept the nation between the 1830s and
the 1870s."). Indeed, this has become the widely accepted view. In contrast, Erik Monkkonen
contends that policing arose as part of an innovative consolidation and rationalization of
governmental power that diffused across the country "without regard for specifically threatening
situations." MONKKONEN, supra note 15, at 56. My short Essay cannot realign scholarship in this
larger field of debate, nor does it seek to do so. However, the research presented here does suggest
that fears of violent social breakdown had only an indirect relationship to the detention and
interrogation of material witnesses.
116See Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention, supra note 14, at 742-43
(discussing how the rise of professional police forces led to the detention of witnesses) and infra text
accompanying note 118-20 (discussing the reduced tort liability of arresting officers which
accompanied the professionalization of policing).
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urban problems and that
a public that increasingly looked to the government to fix
17
expected criminal convictions to be part of the solution.
D. Efforts to Reform Material Witness Detention

1. Legal Proceedings by Detained Witnesses
Although the actual practice of material witness detention stretched and even

broke legal parameters, relatively few detainees instigated habeas corpus
proceedings, and there is little evidence that tort suits were filed against arresting

officers or magistrates for false imprisonment. A false imprisonment action had
good prospects for success if brought against a third party who maliciously urged
officials to hold a witness," 18 but the common law established that officers who
arrested on reasonable grounds and magistrates who acted within their jurisdiction
could not be found liable." 19 Oliver notes that this distinction came into being at
of the
the time when professional police forces were created and that the reduction
20

liabilities officers faced was a vital stimulant to investigative activity.1
Given the poor fit between state statutory and constitutional authority and the
actual practice of witness detention, the jurisdictional power of the officials
involved and the reasonableness of their conduct may have been open to legal
challenge. 12 1 But bringing a tort case for damages, as Oscar Thompson threatened

117Ramsey, supra note 75, at 1312-13, 1322, 1343-45, 1392 (describing public pressure on
police and prosecutors to control crime by apprehending and convicting perpetrators).
118See Bates v. Kitchel, 132 N.W. 459, 460 (Mich. 1911) (affirming tort judgment against
defendant who maliciously sought to have plaintiff, a prosecution witness in defendant's automobile
speeding case, compelled to appear in appellate proceeding). Cf Winegar v. Chicago B & Q. R. Co.,
163 S.W.2d 357, 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942) (discussing difference in potential liability of arresting
officer and non-official citizen who urges plaintiffs arrest). A police officer who had reasonable
grounds for making an arrest could not be held liable, whereas an arrestee who was not convicted of
any crime might win a judgment for damages against any non-official person who urged his arrest.
See id.
1'9 See, e.g., Lynn v. Weaver, 231 N.W. 579, 580 (Mich. 1930) (affirming directed verdict for
defendant police officers who arrested plaintiff "in good faith and upon proper and probable cause"
and did not unreasonably delay in releasing him on his promise to appear in court); McBumie v.
Sullivan, 153 S.W. 945, 947 (Ky. 1913) (holding that plaintiff could not recover damages for false
imprisonment against a Justice of the Peace who acted within his jurisdiction in jailing plaintiff for
contempt, even if he did so maliciously); Johnson v. Collins, 89 S.W. 253, 254-55 (Ky. 1905)
(holding that police officers were not liable for false imprisonment where they conducted a
warrantless arrest upon reasonable grounds and promptly took arrestee before a magistrate);
McCarthy v. DeArmit, 1 Pennyp. 297, *312 (Penn. 1881) ("An innocent man is unfortunate when he
is suspected of having committed a high crime, and is deeply injured when imprisoned upon
suspicion; but he has no redress if his injury came through the proper action of a public officer while
in the faithful performance of his duty.").
120 Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention, supra note 14, at 744-45.
121

See supra note 60 (discussing successful habeas corpus petitions).
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to do, 122 required substantial initiative and resources on the part of detained
witnesses, many of whom were poor, socially marginalized, and even residing in
the country illegally. 23 Hence, for the most part, the wrongs against them
remained unredressed.
2. Case Law and Legislation
Sporadic cries for the reform of material witness detention produced limited
results in courts and legislatures. In New York, sympathy for poor witnesses,
victim-witnesses, and out-of-towners led, first, to the construction of a separate
House of Detention and, then, to the temporary repeal of the material witness
statute in 1883.124 The reform campaigns in Illinois and California also tended to
focus on the inconvenience that jailed witnesses endured because they were from
125
another city or were not affluent enough to post bond.
Reformers' concern about hardship on detainees embodied an explicit critique
of the bounds of state power to enforce a duty to testify on citizens. A common
argument challenged the tradeoff between liberty and crime control by suggesting
that the prospect of dangerous and burdensome detention deterred individuals from
reporting crimes. 12 6 Here, critics of material witness detention encountered
pushback from judges, as well as from police and prosecutors. In one of the few
122 See supra text accompanying note 39.
123See supra text accompanying notes 51, 62, 96, 99-100. In recent history, thanks in part to
the rise of public-interest lawyers, civil-rights causes of action, and congressional authorization of
attorneys' fees for civil-rights plaintiffs, witness detention lawsuits have become more of a reality,
and the expense of such suits has forced some police departments to change their practices. The City
of Detroit, for instance, has paid millions of dollars to settle civil cases arising from illegal witness
detentions. See $3.4 Million Paidto Jailed Witnesses, DETROIT NEWS, July 13, 2003, at 1A. In 2003,
Detroit entered two consent decrees mandating changes in myriad police department policies,
including a requirement that officers obtain court approval before detaining material witnesses. See
Feds Order Overhaul ofDetroitPolice, DErorr NEWS, June 13, 2003, at IA.
124 See Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention, supra note 14, at 768, 765,
779.
125 For example, the Chicago Tribune recounted the story of a theft victim "detained over four
weeks in the unwholesome County Jail as a witness, and [reported] that his health had seriously
suffered thereby." The City in Brief,supra note 73. See also, e.g., Untitled Article, Ci. TRm., May
15, 1873, at 4 ("Our county jails, as a rule, are scarcely fit receptacles for the most hardened
criminals, but when innocent witnesses are remanded to them because they are not able to furnish bail
for their appearance, the hardship is considerably increased."); County Legislation: Better Quarters
to be Providedfor Detained Witnesses, Cin. TRm., Sept. 24, 1872, at 6 ("Commissioner Wahl said if
a stranger came to town and was robbed he was put in jail, having no friends, until the thief was tried;
the latter, having friends, being able to secure bail.").
126 For instance, an editorial in a Chicago paper in 1859 lamented that "the witness is so
harshly treated as to inspire a dread of letting it be known, even if he possesses the means of bringing
down justice upon an offender." The Gregory Case-Detaining Witnesses, THE Cm. PREss AND TRm.,
Oct. 14, 1859, at 01. Oliver notes a similar line of criticism in New York. See Oliver, The Rise and
Fall ofMaterial Witness Detention,supra note 14, at 765.
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published nineteenth-century cases addressing this issue, a court maintained that
uncompensated detention might be ordered "not because [the witness] could not
give the security, but because he could not be trusted to perform his duty as a

citizen, voluntarily and without compulsion."'' 27 The judicial conception of
detention, not as a punishment or a hardship, but as a "public duty" survived

throughout the twentieth century and was affirmed by the United States Supreme

Court in 1973.128 Several decades later, the assumption that certain aspects of
individual liberty must be sacrificed for the police to do their jobs underlies many
measures imposed in the aftermath of the September 11
"homeland security"
29
attacks.1
terrorist
Reformers in the late 1800s and early 1900s still had modest success in
curbing the worst abuses against witnesses. Beginning in the late nineteenth
130
century, case law reinforced that some lengthy detentions were unreasonable;
pre-trial depositions were a desirable and less restrictive alternative; 131 separate
detention facilities should be utilized; 132 and it was "unjust and oppressive" to jail a

witness simply because he could not give bail. 133

Hearings became an

intermittently-enforced formality designed to ensure that magistrates scrutinized
the witness posed a flight risk and possessed
the state's probable cause to believe
1 34
information material to the case.
127 Markwell v. Warren County, 5 N.W. 570, 571-72 (Iowa 1880).
128 Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1973).
129 See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1699, 1702 (2005)
(describing one possible view of democratic policing).
130 See Ex parte Dressier, 7 P. 645, 645 (Cal. 1885) (discharging witness on habeas corpus
because ninety-day detention due to unexplained continuances was unreasonable); Ex parte
Grzyeskowiak, 255 N.W. 359, 361 (Mich. 1934) (holding that although initial imprisonment of
witness was proper because he posed a flight risk, holding him for four months while the murder
suspect still remained at large was unreasonable).
131See State v. Kemp, 124 La. 85, 88 (La. 1909); People v. Lee, 49 Cal. 37, 38 (Cal. 1874).
132 See In re Llewellyn, 62 N.W. 554, 554 (Mich. 1895).
133State of Minnesota ex rel. Howard and Cook v. Grace, 1872 WL 3316 *4 (Minn. Jan. 1,
1872).
134See In re Llewellyn, 62 N.W. 554, 554 (Mich. 1895) ("We have no doubt of the power of
the proper court to detain witnesses upon a proper showing, but such showing should in all cases be
made and the witnesses given a hearing, and an opportunity to be heard before commitment.");
Comfort v. Kittle, 46 N.W. 988, 990 (Iowa 1890) (holding that there must be a preliminary hearing
before a magistrate before a witness could be detained or placed under bond); Quince v. Langlois,
149 A.2d 349, 351 (R.I. 1959) (discharging witnesses to a murder because no examination or hearing
had been held to determine that they possessed material information). Clarification of the proper
procedures for detaining witnesses in federal cases was still needed in the late twentieth century. In
1984, amendments to the Federal Bail Reform Act and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure officially
empowered a judge to order the arrest of a witness "if there are no conditions of release which would
assure his appearance" but also required district-court supervision of that pretrial detention and
periodic reports from the government attorney indicating why the witness should not be released. See
Stacey M. Studnicki, Material Witness Detention: Justice Served or Denied?, 40 WAYNE L. REV.
1533, 1538-39 & nn.32-33 (1994). See also Steve Fainaru & Margot Williams, Material Witness
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However, the coercive

questioning

of individuals

whom

the police

conjectured might be offenders was less often criticized than the incarceration of
those assumed to be "innocent." Oliver indicates that the New York police
acquiesced in abolishing material witness detention only as long as they retained
the power to hold a few persons whom they suspected of crimes. 35 When public
outcry in New York resulted in the passage of the abolition bill, the law retained a
clause allowing magistrates "to demand a recognizance, with or without sureties,
only of those reasonably believed to be accomplices in crimes."' 31 6 Similar
language appeared in judicial opinions from other states during approximately the
same time period. For example, a Pennsylvania judge stated in 1902 that "[i]t is
only the unsettled vagabond or wayfarer, or a person suspected of complicity with
137
the defendant... who may be held to bail."'
Oliver contends that, due to the reform campaign's focus on "innocent"
witnesses who could not post bond, the New York public was unaware of an
138
important reason for detaining witnesses: the interrogation of potential suspects.
In contrast, such ignorance about the incarceration of suspected witnesses does not
seem to have existed in California or Illinois. Newspaper reporters and their
readers in these states clearly knew that the police conducted fishing expeditions in
which detained witnesses were viewed as possible perpetrators, but such
knowledge did not produce uniform attitudes toward the potential suspects' plight.
Whereas many journalists simply reported that witnesses had been subjected to the
sweat-box method without commenting negatively on the practice, 139 the
prolonged interrogation of uncharged detainees occasionally generated loud
criticism, as it did in Thompson's case in Chicago. 14°

Law Has Many in Limbo, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at Al (describing the necessary showing
to detain a witness under a federal statute passed in 1984).
135 See Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention, supra note 14, at 774-76,
780.
136 Id. at 779.

137 See In re Mary Engelke, No. 514, 1902 WL 2855, at *2 (Pa. Quar. Sess. Feb. 17, 1902).
138See Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention, supra note 14, at 728, 779,
781.
139 See supra note 102, at 3 (reporting that witnesses to a murder "have been put through the
regular 'sweat box' by the officers, but refused to say anything about the case."); see also, e.g.,
M'Cord Says Allen Had the Chisel, Cm. Tam., Apr. 9, 1893, at 1 ("Allen was placed under arrest,
ostensibly to be held as a witness, but really that evidence might be collected.").
140 See supra text accompanying notes 36-37 (describing efforts to secure Thompson's release
from a Chicago jail). See also, e.g., Friends to the Rescue, L. A. TIMRES, Feb. 10, 1920, at H6
(reporting on the detention of Julia Smith as a witness in a graft case and noting that "[t]he fight to
secure the young woman's liberty has been watched with much interest and curiosity").
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3. Police Reform and the Interrogation of Detained Witnesses
A nineteenth-century Los Angeles Times editorial lamented "the illegal
method ... of holding persons on suspicion, without booking them, or placing any
charge against them."' 141 This editorial and others like it eventually flowed into a
broader stream of concern about police misconduct and inefficiency that
culminated in the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, one of two
Wickersham Commission volumes published in 1931.142
Nevertheless material witness detention was hardly the central focus of the
most influential reform efforts in the interim decades. Thompson's controversial
detention in 1902 coincided with a Progressive agenda of sweeping change in
criminal justice administration. However, the primary zeal of Chicago reformers
was directed elsewhere-toward eliminating the fee system, replacing political
bosses with professional experts, and using socialized courts to deal with
"domestic" ills, such as juvenile offending and spousal non-support. 143 Arguably,
the temporary detention of individual witnesses was not anathema to the principles
of Progressive reformers whose drive to consolidate and professionalize municipal
44
and the
government produced a discretionary, inquisitorial style of judging'
45
interests.1
social
of
balancing
the
to
rights
individual
of
subordination
Later, in the 1920s and 1930s, urban elites bent on introducing systemic
efficiency to policing and prosecution produced a series of crime-commission
analyses designed to enhance and legitimize crime control. 14 6 One of these, the
1931 Wickersham report, briefly complained about material witness detention as
part of its larger indictment of the third degree. Lawlessness in Law Enforcement
"ignored the more mundane areas of recruitment, training, and records where
considerable progress had been made" in professionalizing law enforcement and
147
instead offered a scathing critique of police misconduct during interrogations.
Shining a spotlight on brutality toward suspects, the report specifically mentioned
the detention and questioning of witnesses among its catalog of unreformed
abuses. 14 8 It noted with disapproval the mental suffering that might result from
months of detention, characterized this suffering as "equivalent to the third

141A Broken Pledge-The Police Still IncarceratingPrisoners Secretly, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31,
1899, at 11.
142 REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 6.

143 See MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA
CHICAGO 19, 25, 27, 31, 123 (2003).
'44 See id. at 122.

141 See id. at 61, 83, 110, 123.
'46 See id. at 290-307.

147 WALKER, supra note 15, at 134.

148 See REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS INLAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 6, at 93, 129.
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degree," and stated that "[d]etentions may work particular hardship for persons
merely held as witnesses.' 49
The secrecy of police interrogations ranked among the Commission's top
concerns. In Chicago, the police were especially "slow about bringing prisoners
into court or even booking them. As far as the records show, men [were] usually
produced in court not later than 48 hours after arrest; but in fact, the true date of
arrest [was] often not entered in the police blotter."' 50 Moreover, witnesses and
other incommunicado detainees might be held somewhere other than the police
station. The report cited a book on Chicago detentions revealing that "witnesses in
sensational cases [were] taken to newspaper offices, hotels, etc, and there grilled
for evidence."' 15' The abuse of detained witnesses might never come to light, the
Wickersham report indicated, because the third degree was "used mainly to get
52
clues leading to objective evidence or the arrest of some other person."'
Yet, despite this brief discussion of the problem, witness detention
nevertheless remained at the margins of the Commission's reform agenda and did
not attract attention the way more graphic descriptions of beatings and other police
brutality did. Rather than constituting one of the main foci of the Wickersham
investigation due to their perceived innocence, the detained witnesses became a
small, nearly forgotten part of an expos6 of coercive approaches to the potentially
guilty.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Essay suggests two departures from prior scholarship. First, it presents
alternatives to the limited analysis of material witness detention previously
available in historical scholarship on criminal procedure. Second, and perhaps
most importantly, it offers a counterweight to the common assumption that the
Justice Department's response to the September I1 attacks fundamentally
transformed criminal procedure in the United States.
This Essay not only traces the roots of witness detention to the nineteenth
century but also shows that this coercive law enforcement tactic did not wane in
the twentieth. The latter point contrasts with Oliver's work on the topic. Oliver
contends that, when statutory authority to detain witnesses was restored in New
York in 1904, it had lost much of its controversial sting because it would
149Id. at 93 (describing the effect of lengthy detentions in New York City).
150Id. at 127. The falsification of police blotters represents a significant impediment to
historical research on the practice of detaining witnesses because, although some police blotters
survive, particularly in Chicago, they do not contain truthful, accurate information about the length
and reasons for confinement.
'5' Id. at 129 (quoting A.I. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM INCiCAGO (1927)).
152Id. at 54. The coercion of detainees in this context seems all the more likely, given the
Supreme Court's holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination
does not protect individuals who are never prosecuted. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).

2009]

IN THE SWEAT BOX

henceforward be used against potential accomplices, rather than innocent
individuals. He further suggests that "police in the twentieth century would be
much more circumspect in using this power than their nineteenth century
predecessors . . . .

In contrast to Oliver's analysis, this Essay shows that

material witness detention did not decline in the twentieth century, nor did public
criticism of the practice cease. However, because reform efforts were limited and
often focused more intensely on other ills of law enforcement, police officers
continued to arrest, confine, and interrogate witnesses. The detainees included
those who were unofficial suspects, as well as those mainly deemed to pose a flight
risk.
Moreover, in contrast to recent critiques of the Justice Department's terrorfighting tactics, 154 this Article demonstrates that the incommunicado incarceration
and questioning of so-called witnesses has a long history embedded in the
consolidation of governmental power over the individual, rather than being
impelled by a specific crisis. The War on Terror has become a justifying ideology,
but it is not a full explanation of the government's intrusion. Instead, the detention
of witnesses belongs to an old story of conflict between constitutional and
statutory protection of personal freedom and the increasingly invasive practices of
the state, beginning in the nineteenth century.

153 Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention, supra note 14, at 782.
154

See supra text accompanying notes 2, 4, 7-8, 86.

